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 STATUS AND CONTRACT IN AN EMERGING 
DEMOCRACY: THE EVOLUTION OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN GHANA 
©Paul F. Kirgis* 
 
Abstract 
Ghana is one of the developing world’s success 
stories. The first sub-Saharan colony to gain 
independence, it is a stable democracy experiencing 
sustained economic growth. Yet as Ghana reaches 
for the material gains of participation in modern 
commercial life, its dual legal systems—the system 
of customary adjudication by traditional authorities 
and the formal court system—have come under 
increasing pressure. New legal developments have 
truncated the authority of traditional decision-
makers, while an overburdened court system lacks 
the resources to fill the resulting adjudicative gaps. 
To solve the problem, Ghana is now experimenting 
with a system of quasi-public dispute resolution, 
including contractual arbitration and court-
connected mediation. If successful, this experiment 
could provide a model for other emerging 
democracies seeking to promote greater access to 
justice while integrating traditional and national 
adjudicative structures. 
 
“[T]he movement of progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” 
-Henry Sumner Maine1 
                                                
*Professor of Law and Faculty Chair of the Hugh L. Carey Center for 
Dispute Resolution, St. John’s School of Law. I am grateful to Jacqueline 
Nolan-Haley and Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene for sharing their research, 
and to Dennis Lynch and the Giving to Ghana Foundation for supporting the 
trainings and research in Ghana. Janai Nelson, Jeff Walker, Jacqueline Nolan-
Haley, Elayne Greenberg, Ran Kuttner, Robin Cooper, and the participants in a 
faculty workshop at St. John’s University provided valuable comments on this 
article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In declaring that progressive societies move from status to 
contract, Henry Maine meant that the societies of western Europe 
had transitioned from legal systems in which the parties’ 
relationships to one another defined the scope of their rights and 
obligations to systems in which the parties defined their own rights 
and obligations, within broad parameters. Leaving aside the 
question of whether such a transition could take place in any 
society—let alone whether such as transition is inevitable in every 
society—Maine’s famous dictum captures a fundamental 
distinction between traditional societies, which tend to be 
organized hierachically based on family, clan and tribe 
relationships, and modern Western societies, which tend to be 
organized individually based on markets and legal rights. Those 
organizational structures reflect important differences in the values 
motivating social action. Traditional societies tend to emphasize 
the values of community and religious observance, while Western 
societies place more importance on personal autonomy and the rule 
of law. 
Centuries of Western influence and interference have left 
few purely traditional societies intact. Colonial powers typically 
retained traditional structures as a means of local control, while 
superimposing formal governing institutions on the Western model 
to protect colonial interests. The result was the development of 
dual legal systems, with traditional structures remaining rooted in 
community and religious values and national courts promoting 
autonomy through the application of positive law.2 As the 
comparatively young nations of the developing world strive for the 
material benefits of participation in the modern global economy, 
these dual legal systems have come under increasing pressure, 
buffeted by a range of disruptive social forces, including 
migration, urbanization, and demands for recognition from women, 
ethnic minorities, and other outsider groups. The integration of 
these dual systems poses one of the most important challenges 
developing countries face.  
                                                                                                         
1 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164-165 (10th  ed. 1884). 
2 See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism, J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 6 (1986) 
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Among the emerging nations, Ghana stands out as model 
worth watching. The first sub-Saharan African colony to achieve 
independence, Ghana has a history of relative stability. It has 
largely avoided the wrenching ethnic conflicts that have enveloped 
other African countries in the post-colonial period. Breaking the 
pattern of autocratic rule punctuated by military coups-d’etat, 
Ghana has seen two decades of peaceful democratic government, 
leading to impressive economic growth and development.  
Now, as it looks to take the next steps in its development, 
Ghana is embarking on an experiment in the use of alternative 
dispute resolution to bridge the divide between the traditional and 
formal legal systems. It has instituted a regime of court-connected 
ADR that simultaneously incorporates the traditional authorities 
into the formal court structure and promotes Western-style 
arbitration and mediation as alternatives to both those traditional 
authorities and the courts. If the experiment succeeds, it could 
provide a model for other emerging nations to follow.  
This article analyzes the Ghanaian ADR experiment. It 
grows out of a series of mediation trainings conducted at the 
Marian Conflict Resolution Center in Sunyani, Ghana, a city of 
approximately 250,000 and the capital of the Brong-Ahafo region 
in southwest Ghana, in 2011 and 2012. I participated as a member 
of a team consisting of Ghanaian law professors and faculty from 
St. John’s University School of Law and Fordham University 
School of Law.3 Participants in the trainings included legal aid 
mediators, chiefs, priests, and professionals from academia and 
medicine. Inaugurated by Chief Justice Georgina Wood of the 
Supreme Court of Ghana, the trainings qualified graduates to serve 
as court-connected mediators under the Ghana ADR Act. The 
trainees, like others serving as court-connected mediators and 
arbitrators around the country, will be in the vanguard of a cadre of 
dispute resolution professionals offering a new, hybrid form of 
                                                
3 The trainings were led by Professors Elayne Greenberg and 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, of St. John’s and Fordham, respectively, and 
Professors Nene Amegatcher and Michael Owusu of the Ghana School of Law. 
Many contributed to the project, including Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene, 
who coordinated our attendance at the trial described here, among many other 
things. Funding for the trainings was provided by the Giving to Ghana 
Foundation, the Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution, and the Feerick 
Center for Social Justice. 
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dispute resolution, blending elements of both the traditional system 
and Western processes.  
To provide context for the analysis, I will begin by 
describing a traditional adjudication our group attended in the 
court of the Queen Mother of Sunyani, a small city in the mostly 
rural Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana, West Africa. My goal in this 
section is to show how customary adjudicators, while employing 
processes featuring many of the same mechanisms as Western 
adjudication, resolve disputes on the basis of values widely 
divergent from those seen in Western courts. I will then explain 
those different value systems using models developed by 
prominent contemporary social psychologists. Finally, I will 
describe the new ADR scheme and discuss some initial research 
into its practical implementation. Although it is too soon to 
evaluate the plan, the preliminary findings suggest that the new 
processes have the potential to address at least some of the demand 
for effective dispute resolution not being met by the courts and 
customary adjudicators.  
II. A ROUTINE AFRICAN TRIAL 
Nana Yaa Nyamaa II, the Paramount Queen Mother of 
Sunyani, holds court on Tuesday evenings. She is heir to a 
tradition of tribal chieftancy that goes back centuries in Ghana. 
Enstooled in 1972 at age 17, she is part of the extensive hierarchy 
of Ashanti traditional authorities. Members of the Akan people, the 
largest ethnic group in Ghana, the Ashanti are the traditional tribal 
power in Ghana. The Ashanti had unified most of the modern 
territory of Ghana in the nineneenth century under their king, the 
Asantehene, who ruled his dominions from the Golden Stool in the 
Ashanti capital of Kumasi.4 They remain the most influential 
cultural force in Ghana today.  
The Queen Mother’s court is held in a large, open-air 
gazebo at her “palace,” a small compound centered around her 
ranch-style home. Chiefs and queen mothers sit atop the social 
structure in Ghana and are often well-off in relative terms.5 Most 
                                                
4 WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA 67 
(Princeton 1966). 
5 Candidates for chief are nominated by a queen mother (who may or 
may not be the king’s mother but is normally a relation) out of eligible 
candidates determined according to lines of matrilineal descent. The chief is 
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real property in Ghana is held in a system of allodial and 
usufructory rights, with the land ultimately vested in the “stool” on 
behalf of the entire community, living and dead. Male chiefs hold 
legal title in a capacity similar to a trusteeship.6 They are entitled 
to rents from the land, now collected in the form of taxes.7 
Although they have lost much of their governing power, they 
remain essential adjudicators, hearing disputes involving Ghana’s 
still vibrant customary law. 
Queen mothers function like male chiefs, with certain 
differences. Queen mothers customarily have not been able to hold 
property, so they depend on the chief in their locale for financial. 
In addition, queen mothers were not included in the regional 
councils created by the English colonial administration, so they are 
not part of the governing structure in the same way as the men.8 
Despite these limitations on their power, queen mothers are 
widely-respected decisionmakers. Lacking customary jurisdiction 
                                                                                                         
then elected by a council made up of the heads of the main lineages in an area. 
The highest chief in a particular area is called the paramount chief. See Ernest 
Kofi Abotsi & Paolo Galizzi, Traditional Institutions and Governance in 
Modern African Democracies: History, Challenges, and Opportunities in 
Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 268 (Fenrich, Galizzi, 
and Higgins, eds. Cambridge 2011). 
6 See JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW, 
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 21-22 
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008). Approximately 80% of land in Ghana is held by 
chiefs in this way. 
7 Subject to this allodial title, freeholders have usufructory rights that 
are perpetual and inheritable and allow use and development subject only to 
certain restrictions imposed by the chief. Joseph Blocher, Building on Custom: 
Land Tenure Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, 9 YALE H.R. & DEV. 
L.J. 166, 179-180. 
8 The English used pre-colonial rivalries among the various tribes to 
gain control over most of the area of modern Ghana without the use of violence. 
They promised smaller tribes protection from the Ashanti in exchange for the 
acceptance of colonial recognition of the tribes’ chiefs. They then required the 
chiefs to seek formal installment by the colonial authorities, a process that 
ultimately allowed the English to co-opt the chiefs as surrogate colonial 
administrators. In turn, by invoking their own duty of protection promised to the 
smaller tribes, the English justified military action to subdue the Ashanti, 
fighting a series of wars that finally resulted in the capture of the Golden Stool 
and the unification of the country under English rule in 1901. See Abotsi & 
Galizzi, supra note , at 273. 
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to hear land disputes, they hear mostly disputes involving family 
and commerce—traditionally the bailiwicks of women in Ghana. 
Men tend to take their disputes to chiefs; women tend to take theirs 
to queen mothers.  
On this particular Tuesday, Nana Yaa is hearing a case 
involving two women, a wholesaler of dried fish and a retailer who 
had been unable to pay for a quantity of fish bought on credit. The 
wholesaler has brought her suit to the Queen Mother and paid the 
customary “token,” a combination filing fee and consent to the 
Queen Mother’s jurisdiction. The retailer has similarly accepted 
the Queen Mother’s jurisdiction by paying her own token. 
The Queen Mother sits on a slightly elevated chair with 
symbols representing her stool and a Catholic cross behind her, 
signifying her sources of authority. Six elders—five women and 
one man—surround her. Like all Akan chiefs and queen mothers, 
she has a linguist who serves as intermediary between her and the 
parties, required because in all formal settings chiefs and queen 
mothers do not communicate directly with an audience.9 The 
proceedings, conducted in the local language of Twi, open with the 
two parties taking an oath similar to the traditional Anglo-
American courtroom oath.   
The complainant speaks first. She explains that she sold 
about $1000 worth of dried fish to the retailer on credit. The 
retailer repaid half the amount on schedule but then stopped 
making payments. Eventually, the retailer repaid an additional 
$200, leaving a debt of about $300.  The wholesaler went with her 
son to the retailer’s home to demand payment of the remaining 
debt. When they got to the home, they found the retailer making a 
large pot of soup. This infuriated the wholesaler, who was being 
pursued by her own creditor (a fact the retailer didn't know), and 
who did not have enough money to feed her own family. She 
picked up the pot of soup, took it off the stove, and threatened to 
take it with her. At her son’s urging, however, she relented and put 
the soup bowl down the floor. The retailer responded by calling the 
wholesaler a witch, a serious charge. At least as much as the 
unpaid debt, it is this insult that has provoked the wholesaler to 
bring her case to the Queen Mother. 
                                                
9 See KWESI YANKAH, SPEAKING FOR THE CHIEF: OKYEAME AND THE 
POLITICS OF AKAN ROYAL ORATORY 8 (1995). 
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As the complaining wholesaler states her case, the Queen 
Mother occasionally interjects, through her linguist, to ask 
questions. At one point, the Queen Mother disallows a part of the 
wholesaler’s testimony as hearsay. The retailer is then given a 
chance to cross-examine her before stating her own case. She 
explains that she was unable to make sales for a time because her 
father had died, a fact the wholesaler did not know. She expresses 
her outrage at the wholesaler’s conduct in threatening to remove 
the soup. Taking the food from another person’s house is a gross 
breach of local custom and tradition—a breach that, in the 
retailer’s telling, justified her charge that the wholesaler was a 
witch. After she finishes her statement, the wholesaler is given a 
chance to cross-examine. 
The case turns, dramatically, on the testimony of the only 
non-party witness called to testify, the wholesaler’s son. His 
testimony is devastating to the wholesaler. He says that he had 
advised her not to take the soup and that he was ashamed when she 
did. The two women stand stiffly while he delivers this indictment. 
When he finishes, he asks for permission to speak with the two 
women privately. The proceedings are temporarily adjourned while 
he and the two parties leave the court to converse. They return with 
a proposed settlement. The son has agreed to take out a loan to 
give to his mother so that she can afford to supply new fish to the 
retailer, which will allow the retailer to resume sales and repay the 
wholesaler from the future profits. The retailer promises to pay in 
installments.  
But the parties’ agreement does not end the matter. The 
Queen Mother retains jurisdiction, and must accept any settlement. 
She indicates that she would have found for the respondent 
because taking another person’s food from her house is so contrary 
to customary law that the retailer was justified in calling the 
wholesaler a witch. The Queen Mother forces the wholesaler to 
kneel before her and apologize to the Queen Mother, as 
representative of the community, for that breach of customary law 
before accepting the proposed settlement.  
III. NORMS, LAWS, AND PROCESSES IN A PLURALISTIC DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The proceedings before the Queen Mother had most of the 
features of formal adjudication. The Queen Mother’s court, like all 
chiefs’ courts in Ghana, is legally a part of Ghana’s official system 
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of justice. British colonizers coopted the chiefs in the former Gold 
Coast more than a century ago and incorporated them into the 
proto-national government.10 Lacking either the means or the 
desire to govern the local matters that affected the populace on a 
day-to-day basis,11 the British left the indigenous legal system 
intact, but subordinate to a “formal” English legal system imposed 
from outside.12  
When it gained independence in 1957, the nation of Ghana 
kept this basic structure intact.13 The exogenous, Anglo-American 
style court system the British created was retained.  A Supreme 
Court with five appointed judges sits at the top, with mid-level 
appellate courts below and then a cluster of trial courts including 
high courts, circuit courts, and district courts, in descending order 
                                                
10 HARVEY, supra note , at 196. Using recognition and installment as 
the fulcrum, they created regional councils, including chiefs, to collect the taxes 
that funded the stools and oversaw the native courts. When the Gold Coast 
became the first sub-Saharan colony to achieve independence in 1957, the new 
nation of Ghana retained this basic structure. The regional councils continue to 
be the link between the chieftancy and the state today. See Abotsi & Galizzi, 
supra note , at 275-76. 
11 This tension was not unique to African colonies; it percolated 
throughout the empires of the European powers, leading to a variety of strategies 
for reconciling the traditional and received legal systems. See Brynna Connolly, 
Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology, 
38 CONN. L. REV. 239, 247-48 (2005). Some imperial powers simply abolished 
the traditional systems, by either statute or judicial decision invalidating 
traditional laws and customs. Others incorporated customary rules and/or 
procedures into the formal adjudicative system either in whole or in part. Still 
others allowed the traditional systems to continue to operate without any 
integration into the state system. Id. 
12 See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
GHANA 69-70 (Princeton 1966). The policy of indirect rule in Africa was 
initially formulated by Sir Frederick Lugard in the northern region of Nigeria. 
Id.  
13 The new government promulgated extensive rules for choosing 
between customary and common law, which was defined to include the same 
body of statutory law covered by the Courts Ordinance. Id. at 254, 266-67. In 
addition, the British requirement that customary law be pleaded and proved 
through witnesses when issues of customary law arose in the state courts was 
dropped and customary law instead treated as a matter of law for the court to 
determine. Id. at 267. 
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of jurisdictional power.14 At the same time, Ghana’s Constitution 
provided that “[t]he institution of chieftaincy, together with its 
traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is 
hereby guaranteed.”15 The chiefs’ primary governing responsibility 
today is dispute resolution, through the process officially known as 
customary arbitration.16 The courts have the power to review 
customary awards on grounds that the award “was made in breach 
of the rules of natural justice, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, 
or is in contradiction with the known customs of the area 
concerned.”17 
The chiefs’ courts have most of the formal trappings of 
adjudication, notwithstanding the appellation “customary 
arbitration.” Given the power of compulsory process by the 
Chieftancy Act, chiefs can compel participation in arbitrations 
before them upon pain of both legal sanction and social 
retribution.18 Their awards are enforceable as judgments. Parties 
pay filing fees and take oaths, and basic standards of due process 
are enforced, including notice and the right to be heard and a right 
of confrontation. Basic rules of evidence are followed. 
Despite the overlapping processes, however, customary 
arbitration differs from adjudication in the formal court system in 
                                                
14 Richard C. Crook, Access to Justice and Land Disputes in Ghana's 
State Courts: The Litigants' Perspective, 50 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL 
L. 1, 5 (2004). 
15 Id. Art. 270. 
16 JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW, 
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 156 
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008). The chiefs’ formal judicial power has been nearly 
eliminated over the years, so that today, chiefs have judicial power only in 
chieftancy disputes. For other disputes, chiefs can act as arbitrators. See Abotsi 
& Galisi, supra note , at 278.  
17 Ghana ADR Act § 112(1). 
18 The Supreme Court of Ghana struck down the provision giving 
chiefs the power to impose criminal penalties on parties that fail to appear in 
July 2011. Nevertheless, chiefs still have substantial power to compel attendance 
at customary arbitrations. One legal aid mediator I met told of a lawyer who 
refused to submit to customary arbitration.  When his grandmother later died, 
the chief refused to permit her to be buried in her home community.  The lawyer 
swallowed his pride and went to the chief to ask forgiveness so that his 
grandmother could rest with her people. 
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critical ways. Most importantly, the values and norms underlying 
both the process and the applicable legal rules rest on different 
foundations.  
Social psychologists have posited that all human societies 
rest on a handful of bedrock moral norms that serve to justify and 
constrain action. In the liberal west, moral theorizing tends to focus 
on two sets of moral concerns: first, the obligation not to harm 
others; and second, the obligation to be fair to others. But Jonathan 
Haidt has shown that these are just two of five sets of moral 
concerns that animate societies around the world. In Haidt’s words: 
In addition to the harm and fairness foundations, 
there are also widespread intuitions about ingroup-
outgroup dynamics and the importance of loyalty; 
there are intuitions about authority and the 
importance of respect and obedience; and there are 
intuitions about bodily and spiritual purity and the 
importance of living in a sanctified rather than a 
carnal way.19 
Haidt was building on the work of Richard Shweder, who posited a 
threefold division of moral concerns. Steven Pinker summarizes 
Shweder’s ethical categories as follows: 
Autonomy, the ethic we recognize in the modern 
West, assumes that the social world is composed of 
individuals and that the purpose of morality is to 
allow them to exercise their choices and to protect 
them from harm. The ethic of Community, in 
contrast, sees the social world as a collection of 
tribes, clans, families, institutions, guilds, and other 
coalitions, and equates morality with duty, respect, 
loyalty, and interdependence. The ethic of Divinity 
posits that the world is composed of a divine 
essence, potions of which are housed in bodies, and 
that the purpose of morality is to protect this spirit 
from degradation and contamination.20  
                                                
19 Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, SCIENCE, 
New Series, Vol. 316, No. 5827 (May 18, 2007), pp. 998-1002, at 1001. 
20 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 625 (2011). 
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Pinker melds Shweder’s ethics and Haidt’s moral 
foundations with the system of relational models proposed by Alan 
Fiske. Fiske argued that people understand their relationships—and 
in so doing justify their actions—according to four models: 
Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and 
Market Pricing. Again, Pinker summarizes: 
When people adopt the mindset of Communality, 
they freely share resources within the group, 
keeping no tabs on who gives or takes how much . . 
. . Authority Ranking [] is a linear hierarchy defined 
by dominance, status, age, gender, size, strength, 
wealth, or precedence. It entitles superiors to take 
what they want and to receive tribute from inferiors, 
and to command their obedience and loyalty. . . . 
Equality Matching embraces tit-for-tat reciprocity 
and other schemes to divide resources equitably. . . . 
Market Pricing [is the] system of currency, prices, 
rents, salaries, benefits, interest, credit, and 
derivatives that powers a modern economy.21 
Combining these different approaches, Pinker creates a sort 
of map of moral concerns, with the goal of providing “a grammar 
for social norms”:22 
Shweder’s 
Ethics 
Divinity Community Autonomy 
Haidt’s 
Moral 
Foundation 
Purity/ 
Sanctity 
In-Group 
Loyalty 
Authority/ 
Respect 
Harm/ 
Care 
Fairness/Reciprocity 
Fiske’s 
Relational 
Models 
Communal Sharing Authority 
Ranking 
Equality 
Matching 
Market Pricing/ 
Rational-Legal 
 
Pinker argues that cultures differ from one another in the relative 
weight they assign these different moral values. Western liberalism 
                                                
21 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 627-28 (2011). 
22 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 626 (2011). 
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emphasizes the values on the autonomy end of the spectrum, while 
most other cultures (including western conservatism) give at least 
as much weight to the values associated with divinity and 
community.23 
In Ghana, as in traditional societies generally, the values 
associated with sanctity and community predominate. Ghanaians 
tend to be highly religious, with Christianity the most prevalent 
religion. Reverence for ancestors is strong, as is respect for 
authority and for elders. Honor, hospitality, and gratitude underlie 
social interactions, with elaborate rituals for everything from 
greeting strangers to the rites of passage associated with birth, 
adulthood, marriage, and death.24 While personal autonomy is 
important—no one wants to be violated, physically or otherwise—
it is but one of many concerns, and often not the most important. 
As the custodians of “customary law,”25 the chiefs and 
queen mothers must concern themselves with the entire range of 
those values. Customary law has been defined as “the body of law 
deriving from the local customs and usages of the various 
traditional communities in Ghana” and as “a set of established 
norms, practices, and usages derived from the lives of people.”26 In 
turn, customary law is incorporated into the positive law. Ghana’s 
                                                
23 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 631-33 (2011). 
24 See ASIRIFI-DANQUAH, GHANA’S CULTURAL HERITAGE IN 
RETROSPECTIVE 96-120 (2008). 
25 The Courts Ordinance promulgated by the British in 1935 directed a 
law court faced with an issue of customary law to “call to its assistance Chiefs 
or other persons whom the Court considers to have special knowledge of native 
law and custom” and allowed courts to refer questions of customary law to a 
competent “Native Court.” See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN GHANA 246 (1966). Customary law had to be pleaded and proved in 
the law courts as a question of fact until 1960, when law courts were give the 
power to decide matters of customary law  
26 Joseph B. Akamba & Isidore Kwadwo Tufuor, The Future of 
Customary Law in Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
(Fennich et al. eds 2011). In practice, the system tended to be bifurcated along 
racial, ethnic, and religious lines. Disputes involving only members of the 
indigenous community were handled through traditional processes applying 
customary laws, while disputes involving members of the colonizing community 
were handled through the imported system of courts and laws. See HARVEY, 
supra note , at 201-02. 
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current Constitution provides that “[t]he common law of Ghana 
shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common 
law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the 
rules of customary law,” the latter consisting of “the rules of law, 
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in 
Ghana.”27 The traditional adjudicators link the underlying 
community values to the formal law. 
The case in the Queen Mother’s court shows how, in the 
performance of that function, customary adjudicators consider 
values that western courts ignore. Consider how the dispute 
between the wholesaler and the retailer would be resolved in a 
western court. The dispute would likely end up in a small claims 
court. The court would focus on the retailer’s status as debtor, 
applying legal rules rooted in the values associated with fairness, 
equality matching, and market-pricing. The wholesaler’s threat to 
remove the soup would likely be ignored as irrelevant, while the 
wholesaler’s grievance about being called a witch would not rise to 
the level of actionable slander, because it would fail the legal 
requirement of financial damage associated with the value of 
harm/care. 
In the Queen Mother’s court, liability for the debt played a 
decidedly secondary role, as both the disputants and the tribunal 
focused on the threatened removal of the soup. That action 
contravened social norms associated with communal sharing: 
entering another family’s home and taking their food violates the 
                                                
27 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana Art. 11(2)-(3) (1992). The 
courts have the power to reject a rule of customary law on grounds that it is 
counter to public policy as determined by reference to modern social conditions. 
Joseph B. Akamba & Isidore Kwadwo Tufuor, The Future of Customary Law in 
Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 217 (Fennich et al. eds 
2011). In the words of Justice Taylor of Ghana’s Supreme Court, “If customary 
laws are to develop to meet the demands of a civilized populace and if they are 
to play any meaningful role in a concerted national effort to clean our country of 
corruption and unsavory practices, then we must endeavor to remove these 
artificial barriers that tend to block away and disable us from carrying out our 
functions.” Sarkodie I v. Boateng II, G.L.R.D. 73 (1982), quoted in Akamba & 
Tufuor, supra note , at 214. For example, in one case the Court of Appeals 
rejected a local custom allowing a landlord to remove valuable crops grown by a 
tenant, declaring that “the customary law . . . became outdated and ceased to be 
law as soon as conditions in society changed so as to make it unreasonable for 
persons to conduct themselves by it.” Attah v. Esson, 1G.L.R. 128, 133 (1976), 
quoted in Akamba & Tufuor, supra note , at 215. 
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family group bond reinforced by rituals such as commensal meal-
taking.28 The “witch” epithet—which under other circumstances 
would transgress norms associated with divinity and sanctity—was 
then considered and justified as a legitimate response to the breach 
of customary norms. 
Further, the disposition of the case required the Queen 
Mother to perform a social role far removed from the legal 
remedies available to a judge hearing a case raising similar 
contract and tort claims in a court of law. Despite the parties’ 
agreement on a settlement restoring the business relationship, the 
case was not resolved until the Queen Mother received an apology 
from the wholesaler, setting the stage for the reintegration of the 
wholesaler into the community. That is a function that judges in 
courts of law—whether in the U.S. or in Ghana—do not and 
cannot perform. Like western courts, the courts of law in Ghana 
enforce contract and tort remedies that resolve disputes through the 
retrospective application of rules of law to determined facts, with 
damages or the adjustment of legal rights the typical remedial 
measures.29 In contrast, traditional dispute resolution emphasizes 
the goals of reconciliation and reintegration. Remedies tend to look 
forward, with the goal of reestablishing harmony within the 
community.30 A chief or a queen mother is not merely a 
representative of the government tasked with applying rules of law, 
but the instantiation of the community, tasked with upholding 
community norms and standards. 
The similarities in process between customary courts and 
courts of law can thus mask important differences in social role. 
Customary adjudicators publicly recognize and enforce social 
norms within defined communities. Those norms are rooted in a 
range of values, from community and sanctity to autonomy. Judges 
in the western-style courts of law make factual determinations and 
                                                
28 Pinker at 627. 
29 See Hon. Yaw Appau, Assessment of Damages (Paper Presented at 
Induction Course for Newly Appointed Circuit Court Judges at the Judicial 
Training Institute), available at 
http://jtighana.org/new/links/papers/ASSESSMENT%20OF%20DAMAGES%2
0-Justice%20Yaw%20Appau.pdf.  
30 VOLKER BOEGE, TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION—POTENTIALS AND LIMITS 7 (Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management 2006). 
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apply rules of positive law that have been imposed from above and 
that rest, to a much greater degree, on autonomy-based values such 
as fairness and market-pricing. Each regime has an important role 
to play in Ghana’s dispute resolution structure. For reasons I will 
explain in the next section, both systems have come under 
pressure, necessitating Ghana’s ADR experiment.  
IV. A DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM UNDER PRESSURE 
Customary adjudicators like the Queen Mother of Sunyani 
are essential cogs in Ghana’s national machinery of dispute 
resolution. The trial courts are overwhelmed by the number of 
cases, particularly land cases, filed each year. Low settlement rates 
exacerbate the problem, leaving cases to languish for years in the 
resulting backlogs.31 As a result of the judicial backlog and the 
inaccessibility of the courts to much of the populace, in many 
cases, a chief or queen mother may be the only practical dispute 
resolution option. Chiefs and queen mothers are widely respected 
as decisionmakers.32 A recent survey found that 76.4% of surveyed 
people would go to the chief if they had a land problem, as long as 
the chief did not have a personal stake in the matter.33 
As Ghanaian society undergoes the rapid changes brought 
about by development and modernization, however, the traditional 
dispute resolution system is also coming under increasing pressure. 
Some of this pressure is the product of deliberate legislative 
change. One prominent example is the Intestate Succession Law of 
1985, which was crafted to counteract the discriminatory effects of 
customary intestacy law on women. Under customary law, a 
widow of an intestate decedent had no claim to the marital 
property, which belonged exclusively to the husband’s blood 
family. The family had a customary obligation to support the 
widow, but with the dislocations of modern life, that obligation 
was often ignored, leaving widows destitute.34  
                                                
31 Id. at 6-7. 
32 JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW, 
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 156 
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008). 
33 UBINK, supra note , at 156 (Leiden Univ. Press 2008). 
34 See Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in 
the Context of Legal Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 391-92 
(2006). 
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Under the Intestate Succession Law, widows are entitled to 
keep a share of their “self-acquired” property, but not of the 
“lineage” property. Self-acquired property is “that which a person 
acquires through his own expertise, without any help or assistance 
from his [lineage] property, or by gift to himself personally.”35 
Lineage property is the property of the husband’s blood family, as 
determined among the Akan through matrilineal succession. 
Lineage property is “that which has been inherited and which from 
that point is managed by the lineage as a corporate body through 
the lineage head or representative.”36 This alteration of customary 
principles contradicts traditional norms about the roles of women 
that have deep roots in Ghanaian life. It requires fact-finding and 
application of legal rules that fit uncomfortably with the customary 
legal regime. 
Economic growth itself also serves to undermine traditional 
practices. For example, with the surging value of urban land, chiefs 
have increasingly attempted to sell stool lands for personal gain, 
even where those lands are under cultivation by community 
members who have been working them for generations.37 And the 
influx of foreign investment puts added pressure on the social 
structures bonding local communities, as evidenced by the recent 
conflicts over alleged illegal gold mining by Chinese prospectors.38 
These disruptions are manifested in changing patterns of 
dispute resolution. As effective as customary arbitration can be in 
resolving local disputes like the one in the Queen Mother’s court in 
Sunyani, it is ill-suited to the resolution of disputes arising under 
positive law, to disputes in which chiefs are parties, and to disputes 
between local community members and outsiders. The result is an 
increasing resort to courts saddled with inadequate resources and 
inefficient processes.39 The legal issues raised by the newly 
                                                
35 Jeanmarie Fenrich and Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, 
Culture, and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
259, 288 (2001), quoting CHRISTINE OKALI, COCOA AND KINSHIP IN GHANA: 
THE MATRILINEAL AKAN OF GHANA 12, 15 (1983). 
36 See Fenrich & Higgins, supra note , at 314-20. 
37 See UBINK, supra note , at 86-87, 128. 
38 See Adam Nossiter & Bree Feng, Ghana Arrests Chinese in Gold 
Mines, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, at A11. 
39 See UBINK, supra note , at 176-77. 
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available legal rights, such as the proof problems inherent in 
proving that marital property is “self-acquired,” serve to heighten 
the litigiousness.40 
The very values that undergird traditional Ghanaian life 
seem to contribute to the judicial morass. Litigation in Ghana is 
distinguished by its startlingly low rates of settlement. In contrast 
to the United States, where at least 40% of civil cases filed in 
federal court are settled,41 less than 10% of Ghanaian lawsuits are 
settled.42 While there is no definitive answer to the question of why 
the settlement rate is so low, the reason seems at least partly 
related to a desire for authoritative decisions and a fear of 
noncompliance with contractual settlements.43 
As it continues to develop and grow, Ghana faces an 
ongoing challenge in integrating its legal systems and providing 
access to justice. Greater mobility among the populace, 
immigration, and increased trade both within the country and 
across borders will test traditional systems of value, initiating 
conflicts not easily resolved by resort to traditional norms in 
traditional processes, and putting added pressure on a court system 
that is already overburdened. 
These are challenges that all developing countries face. As 
one of Africa’s success stories, Ghana has the potential to emerge 
as a model for other developing countries, both in Africa and 
around the world. In 2012, Ghana experienced a third successive 
peaceful and democratic Presidential election, and it has seen 
average annual economic growth of 6.5% since 2000.44 The 
discovery of oil has pushed that growth into double figures in 
recent years, though with the attendant risks of corruption that 
                                                
40 Id. at 316-20. 
41 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? 
Settlements, Nontrial Adjudication, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing 
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 705, 732-33 
(2004). 
42 See Crook, supra note 14, at 17. 
43 See Crook, supra note 14, at 14. 
44 This figure is reported by the African Development Bank, available 
at http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economic-
outlook/.  
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come with the exploitation of natural resources in developing 
countries. The country has largely avoided the crippling ethnic and 
religious conflicts that have consumed other West African 
nations.45 Significant problems remain, to be sure, with 
employment, public health, and environmental sustainability 
topping the list of concerns.46 But Ghana has a head start on most 
countries in Africa in the construction of the stable and inclusive 
political and economic institutions that are the foundations of a 
successful modern state. For these reasons, Ghana’s response to 
the challenges of legal integration merits attention. 
V. AN EXPERIMENT IN QUASI-PUBLIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
In recent years, Ghana has embarked on an experiment in 
the integration of traditional and state legal systems under the 
rubric of alternative dispute resolution. The primary vehicle for 
this experiment is the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2010 
(the “Ghana ADR Act”), an ambitious attempt to standardize the 
provision of commercial arbitration, mediation, and customary 
arbitration nationwide.47  It has simultaneously limited and 
formalized the adjudicative power of the chiefs and created a 
system of quasi-public, Western-style ADR, with arbitration and 
mediation conducted under the auspices of the courts. The goal is 
                                                
45 Lawrence Juma, Africa, Its Conflicts And Its Traditions: Debating A 
Suitable Role For Tradition In African Peace Initiatives, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L 
L. 417, 421 (2005)(estimating that one quarter of African nations were 
experiencing civil strife in 2005). Despite its relative stability, Ghana has not 
entirely escaped civil strife. See Ulrike Schmid, Legal Pluralism as a Source of 
Conflict in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 46 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 
5 (2001)(describing a series of ethnic conflicts in northern Ghana culminating in 
a civil war in 1994). 
46 Id. 
47 The ADR Act is the culmination of a multi-year process of 
increasing access to alternative dispute resolution, beginning with the Courts 
Act of 1993, which encouraged judges to promote settlement of civil lawsuits. 
See Courts of Act of 1993, Act 459 (Ghana), Sec. 73(1) available at 
http://ghanalegal.com/?id=3&law=116&t=ghana-laws (“Any court with civil 
jurisdiction and its officers shall promote reconciliation, encourage and facilitate 
the settlement of disputes in an amicable manner between and among persons 
over whom the court has jurisdiction.”). For an overview of the development of 
the national ADR program, see Jacqueline Nolan-Haley & James Kwasi Annor-
Ohene, Procedural Justice Beyond Borders: Mediation in Ghana, __ HARVARD 
NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW (Online Article) __ (2014). 
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to reduce the burden on courts by creating a regularized system of 
ADR encompassing both traditional norms and processes and 
norms derived from liberal, western legal systems.48 
In many ways, the commercial arbitration provisions of the 
Ghana ADR Act reflect western standards for commercial 
arbitration. For example, in language not unlike sections 2 and 3 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, the Ghana ADR Act provides that 
arbitration agreements are irrevocable49 and requires a court in 
which a suit has been brought to refer the matter to arbitration if it 
determines that the claim is covered by a valid arbitration 
agreement.50 And the Ghana ADR Act codifies the separability 
principle of Prima Paint, declaring that “an arbitration agreement 
which forms or is intended to form part of another agreement, 
shall not be regarded as invalid, non existent or ineffective 
because that other agreement is invalid or did not come into 
existence or has become ineffective and shall for that purpose 
be treated as a distinct agreement.”51 Like the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,52 the Ghana 
ADR Act incorporates the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, giving 
the arbitrators the power to determine their own jurisdiction.53  
In other respects, however, the Ghana ADR Act envisions a 
different relationship between private arbitration and the courts 
than western arbitration law contemplates. The Act excludes 
certain classes of cases from arbitration, including matters 
                                                
48 See CJ Asks Ghanaians to Patronise Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
GhanaWeb, Oct. 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=194
762. 
49 Ghana ADR Act § 3(2). 
50 Ghana ADR Act § 6. 
51 Ghana ADR Act §3(1). 
52 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
Art. 16(1)(2006). 
53 Ghana ADR Act § 24 (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, particularly in respect of (a) the 
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement; (b) the existence or 
validity of the agreement to which the arbitration agreement relates; (c) whether 
the matters submitted to arbitration are in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement.”). 
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“involving the national or public interest” and environmental 
matters, in addition to “any other matter that by law cannot be 
settled by an alternative dispute resolution method.”54 More 
significantly, the Act grants courts a greater supervisory role in the 
arbitration process than they have in the U.S. the power to review 
arbitral awards for errors of law.55 Despite giving arbitrators the 
power to determine their own jurisdiction, the Act allows a party 
“dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s ruling on jurisdiction” to apply to 
the High Court “for a determination of the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction.”56 Parties may also apply to a court to “determine any 
question of law that arises in the course of the proceedings if the 
Court is satisfied that the question substantially affects the 
rights of the other party.”57 In these ways, the arbitration process 
seems designed to function as a corollary to the public legal system 
rather than as a free-standing private alternative.58  
                                                
54 See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 § 1.  
This provision limits application of the Act to those matters not involving:  
(a) the national or public interest; 
(b) the environment; 
(c) the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or 
(d) any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative 
dispute resolution method. 
55 See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 § 
26(6)(a)(allowing judicial review of a question that “involves a point of law 
which is fundamental to the case”). 
56 Ghana ADR Act § 26(1). 
57 Ghana ADR Act § 40(1). 
58 The Ghana ADR Act limits the scope of judicial review of arbitral 
awards to a range of considerations similar to those provided in western statutes, 
allowing a court to set aside an award only where: 
(a) a party to the arbitration was under some disability or 
incapacity; 
(b) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is not valid; 
(c) the applicant was not given notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the proceedings or was unable to present the 
applicant’s case; 
(d) the award deals with a dispute not within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement or outside the agreement except that the 
STATUS AND CONTRACT IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY 
 21 
Like the arbitration provisions, the mediation provisions 
suggest a conception of mediation that diverges from American 
norms. In the U.S., mediation is largely unregulated. No federal 
law and very few state laws expressly govern the practice of 
mediation as a general matter. The Uniform Mediation Act 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws had been enacted by eleven states and the 
District of Columbia as of 2013,59 but its overriding purpose is to 
establish an adjudicative privilege for mediation communications, 
providing almost no guidelines for the actual conduct of 
mediations.60 In contrast, the Ghana ADR Act governs everything 
from the number of mediators61 to the type of pre-mediation 
submissions required62 to confidentiality, both within the 
mediation and with respect to third-parties.63 It has very broad 
application, covering any and all “mediation,” defined as “a 
nonbinding process . . . in which the parties discuss their dispute 
with an impartial person who assists them to reach a resolution.”64 
In terms of methodology, there is an ongoing debate in the 
U.S. over the extent to which mediators should inject themselves 
into the process to guide the outcome. Professor Len Riskin 
captured the competing conceptions of the mediator’s role in his 
distinction between “evaluative” and “facilitative” mediation 
styles: 
                                                                                                         
Court shall not set aside any part of the award that falls within 
the agreement; 
(e) there has been failure to conform to the agreed procedure by the 
parties; 
(f) the arbitrator has an interest in the subject matter of arbitration 
which the arbitrator failed to disclose. 
Ghana ADR Act § 58(2). 
59 http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act. 
60 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2003). 
61 See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 § 65. 
62 See id. § 73. 
63 See id. §§ 78-79.  
64 Id. § 135. 
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The mediator who evaluates assumes that the 
participants want and need her to provide some 
guidance as to the appropriate grounds for 
settlement—based on law, industry practice or 
technology—and that she is qualified to give such 
guidance by virtue of her training, experience, and 
objectivity. 
The mediator who facilitates assumes that the 
parties are intelligent, able to work with their 
counterparts, and capable of understanding their 
situations better than the mediator and, perhaps, 
better than their lawyers. Accordingly, the parties 
can create better solutions than any the mediator 
might create. Thus, the facilitative mediator 
assumes that his principal mission is to clarify and 
to enhance communication between the parties in 
order to help them decide what to do.65 
 While a great deal of evaluative mediation undoubtedly takes 
place in the U.S., the weight of scholarly authority seems to favor 
the facilitative approach.66 The Model Standards of Conduct for 
Mediators, a joint effort of the American Arbitration Association, 
the American Bar Association, and the Association for Conflict 
Resolution, admonish mediators to “conduct a mediation based on 
the principle of party self-determination,” and explain that “[s]elf-
determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced 
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as 
                                                
65 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, 
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
7, 24 (1996). 
66 See, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should 
Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1997)(“[T]he role of mediators 
is to assist disputing parties in making their own decisions and evaluating their 
own situations.”); Joseph P. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator 
Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1001 
(1997)(“Mediation is neither a process designed to marshal evidence leading to 
an advisory opinion by a third party, nor a rehearsal trial in front of judge orjury. 
Rather, mediation is a dialogue process designed to capture the parties' insights, 
imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shaping 
their preferred outcomes.”). 
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to process and outcome.”67 The emphasis on “informed choices” 
implies that it is not the mediator’s job to inject any particular 
normative principles—whether of law, justice, morality, or 
something else—into the process. Indeed, the standards assume 
that mediators will not guide the parties on the substantive issues, 
advising mediators merely to “make the parties aware of the 
importance of consulting other professionals to help them make 
informed choices.”68  
The Ghana ADR Act seems to encourage a mediation style 
that, in American practice, would be considered highly directive 
and evaluative. It gives control of the process to the mediator: “A 
mediator may conduct the mediation proceedings in a manner that 
the mediator considers appropriate, but shall take into account the 
wishes of the parties . . . .”69 It declares that mediators “shall be 
guided by principles of objectivity, fairness and justice, and shall 
give consideration to, among other things, the rights and 
obligations of the parties, the usages of the trade concerned and the 
circumstances surrounding the dispute, including any previous 
business practices between the parties.”70 To the American ear, 
that guidance sounds closer to a standard for arbitrators than for 
mediators. In suggesting normative factors a mediator should take 
into account, it implies that the mediator plays an active role in 
guiding the parties to a substantive outcome. The Act expressly 
gives mediators the power to “formulate the terms of a possible 
settlement and submit them to the parties for their 
considerations.”71 
If the arbitration and mediation provisions offer somewhat 
different approaches and emphases from their American 
counterparts, the provisions governing customary arbitration have 
no corollary at all.  They represent an attempt to bring customary 
                                                
67 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I(A) 
(2005). 
68 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I(A)(2) 
(2005). 
69 Ghana ADR Act § 74(6). 
70 Id. § 74(5). 
71 Ghana ADR Act § 81(1). 
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arbitration within the ambit of a national, judicially directed system 
of dispute resolution. 
For the most part, the Act’s procedural rules on customary 
arbitration incorporate traditional practice. For example, the Act 
codifies the submission of disputes to customary arbitration, 
including the payment of “a fee or token.”72 It requires customary 
adjudicators “to apply the rules of natural justice and fairness” and 
not “to apply any legal rules of procedure in the arbitration.”73 But 
it also adds procedural requirements that reflect concerns about 
efficiency found in court rules, such as a requirement that 
customary arbitrators issue an award within twenty-one days of the 
first hearing absent a contrary agreement among the parties and the 
arbitrator.74  
Beyond regulating the process of customary arbitration, the 
Act brings customary arbitration formally under the auspices of the 
courts in two main ways. First, it incorporates rules for courts to 
refer matters before them to customary arbitration with the consent 
of the parties.75 In this way, it effectively deputizes traditional 
adjudicators to serve as judicial surrogates in appropriate cases. 
Second, both for cases delegated to customary arbitration from the 
courts as well as for cases initiated in the chiefs’ courts, it confers a 
right of judicial review, empowering a party “aggrieved by an 
award” to apply to a court to set it aside upon a showing that the 
award “(a) was made in breach of the rules of natural justice, (b) 
constitutes a miscarriage of justice, or (c) is in contradiction with 
the known customs of the area concerned.” 
Taken together, the rules for commercial arbitration, 
mediation, and customary arbitration in the Ghana ADR Act entail 
a convergence of three dispute resolution models into a unified, 
quasi-public system of alternative dispute resolution. The 
traditional adjudicators—the chiefs and queen mothers—retain 
their authority to hear matters involving customary law. In that 
forum, the moral considerations that underlie traditional Ghanaian 
society remain paramount, reflected both in the nature of the 
                                                
72 Ghana ADR Act § 90. 
73 Ghana ADR Act § 93(1). 
74 Ghana ADR Act § 107. 
75 Ghana ADR Act § 91. 
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process and in the substantive norms that guide decisions. But the 
traditional courts have been formally integrated into the court 
system, much like courts of limited jurisdiction. Cases within their 
legal jurisdiction can be referred to them, and their decisions are 
reviewable by the courts of law.  
The Act then establishes alternatives to both customary 
adjudication and the courts of law in the form of commercial 
arbitration and mediation—processes imported from the western 
ADR model. These processes have modern roots in the western 
autonomy value. Arbitration—both in the west and in Ghana—is 
made viable by legal rules allowing parties to opt out of the 
(public) court system and choose their own (private) decision-
maker. Although the parties subject themselves to the 
determination of a third-party, they do so voluntarily, by way of 
private contract. The arbitrator’s role is to carry out the parties’ 
agreement; the arbitrator should not import either legal rules or 
customary norms except to the extent the parties have tasked him 
with doing so. Mediation is entirely a function of party consent, 
and western mediators are expected to act primarily as facilitators 
helping the parties find their way to a negotiated resolution. 
Negotiation, in turn, is widely understood in the west to involve 
autonomous actors seeking to make trades based on self-interest 
and the rational invocation of market-based norms.76  
The Ghanaian versions of commercial arbitration and 
mediation limit party autonomy by injecting legal norms into the 
process and, in the case of arbitration, imposing greater court 
oversight than that found in the U.S. They assume an active role 
for the neutral that reflects social recognition of hierarchical 
decisionmaking even for processes ostensibly defined by party 
consent. The respect for authority that is a fundamental feature of 
traditional societies valorizing community and sanctity remains a 
                                                
76 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 10-11 (2nd ed. 1991). By far the most 
influential negotiation text in the English language, Getting to Yes posits a 
vision of “principled negotiation” resting on four principles: 1) separate the 
people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not positions; 3) generate a 
variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and 4) insist that the result be 
based on some objective standard. Id. The underlying assumption is that people 
are autonomous actors, freed from the constraints that social relationships entail 
(“separate the people from the problem”) and entitled to claim benefits based on 
their “interests,” as tested for fairness by reference to “objective standards.” 
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powerful influence in Ghana’s evolving dispute resolution system. 
The Ghana ADR Act has one foot in the western, autonomy-based 
model of private dispute resolution, but the other in a traditional 
model in which distinctions between the public and the private are 
much blurrier and in which community-based values take 
precedence. 
VI. THE ADR ACT IN PRACTICE: INITIAL EVIDENCE 
Whatever the intentions behind the ADR Act, its 
importance will be determined by its implementation. A 
sufficiently large group of neutrals must be available to mediate 
and arbitrate appropriate disputes, and the processes they use must 
meet the needs of those disputing parties. To date, forty-seven 
district and circuit courts have instituted court-connected 
mediation programs, with a goal of full implementation into all 
courts by 2017. In 2012-13, almost 5,000 cases were mediated 
through those programs, with a settlement rate of just under 50%.77 
Implementation has gone furthest in the major metropolitan areas. 
The mediation trainings I participated in were undertaken to extend 
the pool of qualified mediators in the more rural, Brong-Ahafo 
region. 
Consistent with the expressed desires of our Ghanaian hosts 
and colleagues, the trainings imparted a facilitative model of 
mediation, while acknowledging the subtle differences in emphasis 
between the Ghana ADR Act and western standards of conduct for 
mediators. One of the most striking aspects of the experience was 
the participants’ response to the facilitative model of mediation. 
Although few of the participants came in with any knowledge of 
the Ghana ADR Act, they tended to assume, as it does, that the 
third-party neutral would do more than disinterestedly facilitate the 
disputants’ autonomous negotiations. When playing the role of 
mediators, the participants typically expected to be paid deference 
(at least initially). And when playing the role of disputants, they 
invariably looked to the neutral for guidance on everything from 
process to outcome (again at least initially). And whenever a chief 
was in the room, everyone looked to the chief for guidance (both 
initially and thereafter). The notion that the disputants “owned” 
their dispute, in the terminology we sometimes use in the west, 
                                                
77 See Nolan-Haley & Annor-Ohene, supra note 47. 
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seemed foreign to many participants. It did not fit with their 
traditional cultural norms.  
Despite the unfamiliarity and initial hesitation, however, 
many of those participants seemed eager to engage in processes 
that emphasized party autonomy and equality. In particular, the 
professionals with whom we interacted recognize the benefits of 
western-style economic development. Some see the hierarchy of 
traditional authorities as hidebound and unaccountable, if not 
corrupt.78 They embraced western-style ADR as a forward-
thinking alternative to anachronistic chiefs and sclerotic courts—
one that could help Ghana’s development into a modern economy 
benefitting from western engagement. 
Initial research into the perceptions of participants in court-
connected mediation in Ghana suggests that disputants often have 
the same reaction to mediation that the trainees had. They are often 
surprised by the absence of a third-party empowered to make 
decisions. At the same time, however, many seem to embrace the 
more western-style emphasis on autonomy they find in court-
connected mediation. In the summer of 2013, Jacqueline Nolan-
Haley and Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene surveyed fifty-four 
litigants who had participated in court-connected mediations 
conducted by mediators trained at the Marian Conflict Resolution 
Center, asking them a series of questions focusing on their 
perceptions of the procedural justice of the process in comparison 
with other processes.79 While the sample is relatively small, the 
responses suggest that most mediators used a facilitative style and 
that most respondents reacted positively to the emphasis on 
autonomy that style entails.  
The respondents overwhelmingly reported that the 
mediators gave them time to speak, treated them fairly, and did not 
pressure them to accept a settlement. Those responses are at least 
consistent with the conclusion that the mediators employed a 
mediation style placing a premium on party autonomy. The 
individual responses confirm that most respondents felt that their 
autonomy had been respected and liked that dimension of the 
                                                
78 Concerns about judicial corruption, specifically reports that litigants 
often pay bribes to judges to move their cases toward decision, partly motivated 
the push for greater ADR. See Nolan-Haley & Annor-Ohene, supra note 47. 
79 See Nolan-Haley & Annor-Ohene, supra note 47. 
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process. In describing things they liked about the mediation, 
parties said: 
“I was given the opportunity to express myself.” 
“Everyone was given the opportunity to express himself.” 
“The mediators gave much respect to me and allowed me to 
express myself freely.” 
“That mediators treated parties with respect.” 
“The explanation of the ground rules.  My right to 
terminate the session if I didn’t wish to continue.”  
 “Fairness. Respect.” 
Notably, most of the respondents had never participated in 
a formal customary adjudication before a chief or queen mother. In 
addition, more than half were plaintiffs in civil lawsuits. So the 
particular pool surveyed may be more comfortable with processes 
emphasizing autonomy than other Ghanaians experienced in 
customary adjudication. And even among this pool, a number of 
respondents expressed frustration with the relative lack of structure 
and the absence of a decision-maker. Responses to a question 
about things they did not like about mediation included: 
“liberal nature of the process” 
“too much liberty for the parties”  
“The other party was allowed plenty of time to speak” 
“wanted the mediator to pronounce judgment” 
“the respondent was not punished enough” 
As those responses suggest, the same characteristics that one 
disputant considers a virtue may be considered a drawback by 
another disputant. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ghana’s ADR project is a bold experiment in melding 
traditional and modern dispute resolution processes. Because those 
processes rest on different sets of values, the alchemy Ghana is 
attempting will challenge customary norms about the roles of 
parties and neutrals in resolving disputes. Much more study is 
required to assess how mediation is being employed and received 
in Ghana. But the limited data available suggests that many 
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Ghanaians welcome the introduction of dispute resolution 
processes like western-style mediation that emphasize party 
autonomy.  
Whether the traditional authorities share the more 
cosmopolitan Ghanaians’ enthusiasm for these trends is another 
question. I spoke with more than one chief who lamented a 
perceived indifference to the chiefs’ concerns in the drafting and 
enacting of the Ghana ADR Act. Given the prominent role the 
traditional adjudicators still play in Ghanaian life, their acceptance 
and participation will likely play an important role in the success, 
or failure, of Ghana’s ADR experiment. Ghana simply does not 
have the resources to pay a cadre of professional neutrals large 
enough to meet the demand for dispute resolution services. The 
chiefs are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, key cogs in 
the dispute resolution system.80 
The success of Ghana’s ADR experiment will likely hinge 
on its ability to bring together the traditional authorities and the 
modernizers in the legal establishment to create a system of 
alternative dispute resolution that is perceived as legitimate and 
effective. The system that emerges will look very different from an 
American court-connected ADR program, as it must. It will almost 
certainly include both elements of the traditional processes and 
western innovations. It will respect traditional values associated 
with community, sanctity, and structures of authority, while also 
emphasizing party autonomy, fairness, and equity. Its success will 
not be known for years. But if it does succeed, it may provide a 
valuable model for other emerging nations to follow. 
                                                
80 Informal reports from the Marian Conflict Resolution Center indicate 
that at least one of the chiefs who participated in the training has gone on to 
become a mediator in court-referred cases, successfully mediating a number of 
cases to settlement.  
